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Abstract
We describe a model of international, multidimensional policy coordination
where countries can enter into selective and separate agreements with di®erent
partners along di®erent policy dimensions. The model is used to examine the
implications of negotiation tie-in|the requirement that agreements must span
multiple dimensions of interaction|for the viability of multilateral cooperation
when countries are linked by international trade °ows and transboundary pollu-
tion. We show that, while in some cases negotiation tie-in has either no e®ect
or can make multilateral cooperation more viable, in others a formal tie-in con-
straint can make an otherwise viable joint multilateral agreement unstable.
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1 Introduction
International relations involve multiple dimensions of interaction. Even when these
dimensions are not directly interdependent|in the sense of the e®ects of choices along
one dimension being dependent on choices along the others|there can still be cross-
issue negotiation linkage: by exchanging concessions across di®erent policy dimensions,
two countries may be able to achieve cooperation in situations where there would
otherwise be no scope for mutual gains to be attained. Although this idea is not new,1
its implications have so far only been examined in the context of bilateral negotiations,
not multilateral negotiations.
The literature on multilateral international agreements has primarily been con-
cerned with whether single-issue multilateral agreements are immune from the possi-
bility of deviations by a subset of countries. Consistently with the single-issue nature
of the problem it studies, this literature has built upon theories of coalition formation
whereby members of a coalition coordinate all of their actions with other members.2
Simply extending the concept of coalition structure to a multi-dimensional framework
in order to characterize the viability of multilateral cooperation arrangements can be
misleading, because it does not account for the fact that countries can (and often do)
form selective arrangements with di®erent partners over di®erent issues.
Here we draw a distinction between the idea of issue linkage|which refers to the
possibility of forming agreements over multiple issues|and that of issue tie-in|the
requirement that agreements must span multiple dimensions of interactions, ruling out
single-issue agreements. Multilateral cooperation across di®erent issues (issue linkage)
is an equilibrium phenomenon, whereas negotiation tie-in is an exogenous constraint on
the set of possible cooperation arrangements. Whether such a tie-in restriction helps
or hinders multilateral cooperation depends on the payo® structure of the underlying
noncooperative game. In some cases negotiation tie-in can facilitate multilateral coop-
eration by limiting the set of the feasible objections to joint cooperation arrangements.
However, in other cases, rather than inducing parties to trade across issues, a tie-in
restriction can actually constitute an obstacle to multilateral cooperation, as it removes
1The point was ¯rst stressed by Rai®a (1982) and Sebenius (1983). For a recent application to
North-South trade and environmental policy cooperation, see Abrego et al. (1997).
2For an extensive survey of this literature, see Bloch (1997).
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certain counterobjections that could be put forward, out of equilibrium, in order to
support issue trading in equilibrium.
We build our argument by presenting a model of international policy coordina-
tion choices where countries can enter into selective and separate binding agreements
with di®erent partners along di®erent policy dimensions. International relations are
described as a two-stage game, in which agreements are formed in the ¯rst stage and
policies are selected in the second stage|cooperatively among countries participat-
ing in an agreement and noncooperatively between countries belonging to separate
agreements. To accommodate for the possibility of individual countries belonging to
multiple agreements, we de¯ne an equilibrium concept built on a formal distinction
between agreements, as arrangements that determine the payo® structure in the last
stage of the game, and blocking coalitions, as subsets of players that can make objec-
tions to a proposed con¯guration of agreements in the ¯rst stage. Using this construct,
we examine how the stability of the joint global agreement (the agreement structure
where all players jointly cooperate over all strategic dimensions) is a®ected by the im-
position of a tie-in rule, a constraint limiting the set of feasible objections to those
featuring a simultaneous deviation across all issues for each player involved|which in
turn amounts to only considering coalitions of players, rather than general agreement
structures.
We then focus on a more speci¯c model where countries are linked by international
trade and transboundary pollution. In this context, the presence of a tie-in rule would
imply that trade cooperation is conditional on environmental cooperation and vicev-
ersa. This would be in line with the idea, often discussed in the policy debate on trade
and environment, that the WTO should act as an international policing organism,
forcing countries to cooperate over issues that do not strictly pertain to trade policy
narrowly de¯ned.3 It should be stressed, however, that the prevalent position in policy
circles seems to be that the WTO should just accommodate the aims of the parties to
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs),4 without directly extending its reach
3On this point, see Whalley and Hamilton (1996).
4For a discussion of issues related to the integration of multilateral environmental agreements
within the GATT/WTO see Esty (1994) and Brack (1997). Such integration would require a new
interpretation of WTO rules, or possibly even textual amendments to them, so as to legitimize the
use of trade restrictions in accordance with multilateral environmental agreements such as the Basle
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to cover environmental issues, thus rejecting conditionality as a means of promoting
compliance.5
In this model, we show that, while in some cases the stability of a joint multilat-
eral agreement is una®ected or enhanced by tie-in, in others a formal tie-in constraint
can make an otherwise stable joint multilateral agreement unstable. The possibility of
each scenario occurring is illustrated by means of parameterized examples, for which
we derive players' payo®s under alternative agreement structures and bargaining rules.
Negotiation tie-in is more likely to facilitate multilateral cooperation in situations where
the environmental policy stakes are small relative to the welfare e®ects of trade poli-
cies and when partial environmental coordination is preferred to no cooperation by all
countries involved, implying that outsiders can free-ride e®ectively on partial environ-
mental agreements. On the other hand, when the costs of environmental compliance
are high but the ability to free-ride on partial environmental agreements is limited,
a negotiation tie-in restriction can hinder multilateral cooperation by making it both
attractive and viable for a single country to remain outside of any agreement.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a coopera-
tive game of multi-dimensional agreement formation and de¯nes the notion of Stable
Agreement Structure. Section 3 contrasts issue linkage and issue tie-in, discussing their
respective implications for the stability of a joint multilateral agreement. Section 4 ap-
plies these ideas to a simple three-country example in which countries can form trade
and environmental agreements. Finally, Section 5 o®ers some concluding remarks.
Convention on °ows of toxic wastes, the Montreal Protocol on ozone layer depletion or the Kyoto
Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions. This latter approach is re°ected in several speeches made at
the WTO High Symposium on Trade and Environment held in Geneva from 15-16 March 1999, which
available on the WTO web site.
5On several occasions the WTO has strongly rejected the prospect of \becoming an international
body with unilateral powers [...], a world policeman that can force compliance upon unwilling gov-
ernments"; see, for example, the address given by WTO Director General Renato Ruggiero to the
Bellerive/Globe international conference in \Policing the Global Economy", on 23 March 1998.
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2 Multi-dimensional Agreement Formation
In this section we formalize cooperation choices in an environment where players enter
into separate agreements with di®erent partners on di®erent policy dimensions.
2.1 Strategies, Agreements and Behaviour
Consider the following strategic-form game. Let I be the set of players and let the
strategy space for each player i 2 I, §i, be an N(i)-dimensional vector space, with
N(i) 2 N; i 2 I , representing the number of dimensions in each player's strategy.
Strategies for player i are denoted by ¾i 2 §i.
Assumption 1 §i = £j2f1;:::;N (i)g§i;j; i 2 I, where the §i;j ; i 2 I; j 2 N(i) are one-
dimensional sets.
Assumption 1 means that the pure strategy space for each player can be represented
as the Cartesian product of one-dimensional sets. This ensures that choices along
individual dimensions of the strategy vector can be made independently of each other,
i.e. individual dimensions of strategic choice are not directly linked.6
De¯nition 1 The sets §i;j; i 2 I; j 2 N(i) are elementary strategy sets and their
elements ¾i;j elementary strategies.
The space of strategy pro¯les is § ´ £i2I§i = £i2I £j2f1;:::;N(i)g §i;j, and strategy
pro¯les are ¾ 2 §. Players' payo®s are represented by real-valued mappings ¼i : § 7!
R; i 2 I .
In analyses of coalition formation, coalitions are described as non-empty subsets
of I, and this is then interpreted as meaning that the players in each subset pool all
of their elementary strategies and make coordinated choices over them. If we are to
separately represent di®erent dimensions of choice, then coalitions can be de¯ned as
follows. Let S(i) ´ fs ´ (i; j) j j 2 f1; : : : ; N 0(i)gg ; i 2 I|i.e. S(i) is the set of pairs
s = (i; j) such that j is a valid dimension of player i's strategy vector (i.e. s corresponds
6The reason for this assumption will be made clear later. Nevertheless, note that it involves no
loss of generality. Starting from any given game, it is always possible to augment the strategy set by
rede¯ning it as having rectangular support as required by Assumption 1, and then assign an in¯nite
negative payo® for all players to any strategy pro¯le involving the added strategies.
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to a valid index pair (i; j) for elementary strategies ¾ij)|and S ´ Si2I S(i)|i.e.
each element of S corresponds to a di®erent elementary strategy. Finally, let P be a
partition of S whose elements are the sets S(i), i 2 I. Then, a coalition structure C
consists of a partition of S which is coarser than P , i.e. such that all of a player's
elementary strategies belong to a single element of the partition. For the purpose
of our analysis, we wish to examine situations where a subset of players coordinate
their actions with each other only with respect to certain strategy dimensions and not
others, and where the same player can enter into di®erent coordinating arrangements
with di®erent players for di®erent strategy dimensions. To allow for this, one can simply
drop the requirement that the partition of the set of elementary strategies be coarser
than P , and allow instead for arbitrary partitions of S. The resulting partitions G will
be called agreement structures and their elements g will be called agreements. The sub-
pro¯le of elementary strategies in the agreement will be denoted by ¾g ´ (¾s j s 2 g),
and the set of such sub-pro¯les|the strategy set of agreement g|will be denoted as
§g.
De¯nition 2 An agreement g 2 S is a subset of strategy dimensions for a subset of
players.
Note that Assumption 1 ensures that a player assigns elementary strategies to di®erent
agreements, the strategy sets of the di®erent agreements are independent sets.7
De¯nition 3 A participant to agreement g, ~ig 2 fi 2 I j (i; j) 2 g for some jg, is a
player who contributes at least one elementary strategy to the agreement. The set of
participants to agreement g is denoted by Ig.
We shall focus on subgame-perfect equilibria of a two-stage game where players
¯rst enter into binding cooperative agreements and then the resulting agreements in-
teract noncooperatively. Starting from the last stage, let the vector of payo®s for the
participants to agreement g be denoted by ¼g(¾) ´ (¼i(¾) j i 2 Ig).
Assumption 2 (Agreements' behaviour) Each agreement g 2 G chooses ¾g 2 §g so
as to attain a maximal element of ¦g(¾g; ¾¡g) ´ f¼g(¾g; ¾¡g) j (¾g; ¾¡g) 2 §g (where
7Cross-linkage between strategy sets is a complication that is typically assumed away in the analysis
of strategic-form games and that does not arises when players, having independent strategy sets but
possibly not independent choices along di®erent dimensions, form coalitions in the more restrictive
sense of the term.
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¡g stands for G ¡ g). The best-reply correspondence of agreement g, ¾^g : § 7! §, is
thus de¯ned as ¾^(¾¡g) = arg sup¾g ¦g(¾g; ¾¡g).
This assumption simply generalizes best-response behaviour by individual players in a
noncooperative setting to a decision-making unit involving multiple players: no agree-
ment g 2 G can do (Pareto) better than play ¾g, given the behaviour of all other
agreements (¾¡g).
De¯nition 4 A noncooperative outcome for the agreement structure G is a strategy
pro¯le ~¾ such that ~¾g 2 ¾^(~¾¡g); g 2 G. The set of noncooperative outcomes for the
agreement structure G is denoted by ~§(G).
2.2 Stable Agreement Structures
Agreement formation in the ¯rst stage of the game is formalized using ideas from
cooperative game theory. We de¯ne a Core-like equilibrium concept whereby subsets
of players can put forward objections to a certain proposed arrangement, as in Ray and
Vohra (1997). Here, however, we make a formal distinction between agreements among
players to coordinate the use of (one or more) strategies, and coalitions of players who
can make coordinated objections to a proposed agreement structure. The two concepts
are logically distinct: agreement structures determine payo®s in the second stage of
the game; coalitions of players can object to a proposed arrangement by rearranging
the strategies they control, but such objections do not necessarily imply the formation
of agreements between the objecting players.8
In order to describe our equilibrium concept, it is convenient to rede¯ne the game
by \breaking up" the individual players into smaller units each corresponding to a
di®erent elementary strategy:
De¯nition 5 An elementary player is a pair (s = (i; j) 2 S; ¼i), i.e. an element of S
paired with the payo® mapping of the player to which the elementary strategy s belongs.
The payo® mapping for elementary player s is denoted by ¼s.
8In partition function games (games \with externalities"), it is possible for two players to obtain
a higher payo® by acting individually than by coordinating their actions, because of the e®ect of a
third player's response on the noncooperative outcome. Achieving such an outcome, however, may
require abiding by a common, coordinated coalitional choice (i.e. both players must together choose
to act in this way).
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No problem of interpretation arises with respect to the second stage of the game:
under Assumption 2, the set of noncooperative outcomes will be the same whether we
describe the game in terms of players i 2 I or in terms of elementary players s 2 S.
With respect to the formulation of objections to a certain agreement, although we do
not require that individual elementary players who share the same payo® coordinate
their objections, such coordination will not be ruled out by our equilibrium concept.
In other words, elementary players who share the same payo® may still choose to act
as a single player.
We shall also need the following de¯nitions:
De¯nition 6 A restricted agreement structure ~G(S0); S 0 µ S is a partition of S 0.
De¯nition 7 An unrestricted agreement structure is an agreement structure restricted
to S.
Also let G denote the set of all possible partitions of S, and ¹G µ G the set of the
feasible agreement structures, where feasibility is a function of institutional or other
constraints.
Our equilibrium concept can then be described in terms of the two following de¯-
nitions:
De¯nition 8 A restricted agreement structure ~G(S 0); S 0 µ S can be blocked, within
an agreement structure G0 ´ ~G(S0)S ~G(S ¡ S 0), by a coalition S 00 µ S 0 of elementary
players if there exists a restricted agreement structure ~G(S 00)|involving only elemen-
tary players in the blocking coalition|such that, for each of the restricted structures
~G(S 0 ¡ S 00)|involving the remaining elementary players in S 0|that cannot be blocked
under the combined structure G00 ´ ~G(S 00)S ~G(S 0¡S00)S ~G(S¡S 0) 2 G, we have that (i)
8¾^(G00) 2 §^(G00); 8~¾(G0) 2 ~§(G0), it is the case that ¼s(~¾(G00)) ¸ ¼s(~¾(G0)); s 2 S 00,
with the inequality being strict for at least one s 2 S 00; and (ii) ~G(S 0 ¡ S 00) can be
blocked within G00.9 If ~G(S 00) satis¯es the above conditions, we say that it is a stable
objection to ~G(S 00) by S 00.
9According to this de¯nition, an objection is viable for a coalition only if it yields a Pareto superior
outcome for its members under all stable counterobjections that the other players can put forward.
This idea is analogous to Greenberg's (1990) concept of \pessimistic standard of behaviour".
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De¯nition 9 A Stable Agreement Structure G¤ is an unrestricted structure which
cannot be blocked.
Note the recursive nature of the above de¯nition: what is required for an objection
by a coalition of players to constitute a blocking objection is that it must be not only
pro¯table (condition (i)) but also immune from further external or internal deviations,
i.e. it must involve an arrangement that is stable (in the restricted sense) according
to the very de¯nition of stability so obtained.10 In this construct, objections are made
by subsets of elementary players|coalitions in the standard sense of cooperative game
theory|who make alternative arrangements among themselves without involving the
other players. Although such objections are coordinated, they do not necessarily involve
pooling all the corresponding elementary strategies into a single agreement.
This speci¯cation does away with the need for exogenous rules describing the fate
of agreements under an objection involving a subset of its participants (as discussed
by Burbidge et al., 1997): in this de¯nition, stable arrangements can reform for any
restricted set of players, once an objection is made. Also, although objections are
made by successively ¯ner coalitions|as in Ray and Vohra (1997)|the objections
themselves can consist of agreement structures that are coarser than the one to which
a coalition objects to.11
The concept of Stable Agreement Structure appears to be a natural extension of
similar equilibrium concepts that have been described for games of coalition formation;
as is the case for these analogous solution concepts, existence of an equilibrium may in
general be problematic. In practice, the concept of Stable Agreement Structure may
also be di±cult to operationalize owing to the large number of potential objections
and counterobjections that are involved. In our application, however, we shall focus
on a scenario with only three players and two dimensions of choice, where the solution
concept becomes manageable.
10This consistency requirement, ruling out coalitional deviation which are not themselves immune
from further deviations, also characterizes equilibrium concepts such as the Coalition-Proof Nash
Equilibrium of Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987) and the Equilibrium Binding Agreements of
Ray and Vohra (1997).
11Under the Equilibrium Binding Agreement rule of Ray and Vohra (1997), existing agreement
structures are allowed to break only into smaller agreements.
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2.3 Within-agreements Bargaining
Without additional restrictions, Assumption 2 does not tie down behaviour to a speci¯c
distributional objective, and does not rule out asymmetric payo® outcomes within an
agreement where all participants are identical. This °exibility implies that there will
typically exist a continuum of noncooperative equilibria for any agreement structure.
In the rest of our analysis, we shall narrow down the set of possible noncooperative
outcomes by assuming a ¯xed payo® distribution rule within an agreement g, arising
as the solution to a bargaining problem among the participants to g. As elsewhere
in this literature (e.g. Burbidge et al., 1997) we shall assume the bargaining rule to
be anonymous (i.e. symmetric), implying that identical players in identical situations
must obtain the same payo®.
A symmetric bargaining rule involves two ingredients: the set of e±cient (within
the agreement) payo® combinations that can be attained if players form g, and the
\disagreement" payo®s of participants, ¼Dgi ; i 2 Ig. Given these, optimal policy choices
by an agreement can be characterized as the policy combination (or set of combinations)
which maximizes B(¼i ¡ ¼Dgi ; i 2 Ig), where B is a symmetric, concave function.12
Consistently with our characterization of stability, the disagreement point D should
be based on the stable outcomes that prevail if a certain agreement were not to form.
In turn, stability of the disagreement point depends on the payo® distribution in alter-
native agreements, which implies that the characterization of the disagreement payo®s
for the various agreements is linked, recursively, to the characterization of stability
of the restricted structures that are involved in the various objections an counterob-
jections.13 One can interpret this speci¯cation as implying an initial pre-agreement
12It is natural here to rely on a simple extension of two-player bargaining ideas to multi-player bar-
gaining, rather than resort to the multi-player bargaining solution concepts that have been proposed
for superadditive coalition-form games (games without \externalities"), such as the Shapley value.
Such solution concepts de¯ne a division rule for the gains from multilateral cooperation based on
the distribution of payo®s under alternative coalitional outcomes. Our de¯nition of a stable outcome
already calls upon a comparison of payo® outcomes under agreements structures; furthermore, in our
construct the bargaining rule is relied upon to determine a payo® division within agreements for any
agreement structure, not just the grand coalition.
13This approach is consistent with the extensions of the Shapley Value for coalitional form games
proposed by Aumann and Myerson (1988).
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stage where players can unilaterally commit not to enter into certain agreements with
certain partners. Since such a commitment by any single player would automatically
result in the removal of the corresponding agreement structures from the set of feasi-
ble structures, the disagreement point is naturally de¯ned as that payo® distribution
that would result within the resulting restricted space of agreement structures. In the
application of Section 4, we shall focus on a scenario where, in the \pre-game" stage,
players can unilaterally veto the possibility that any agreement will form, in which
case the disagreement point D is taken from the payo® combinations that prevail when
all agreements are singletons (i.e. no agreements form).14
There is a further complication, arising from the non-superadditive structure of the
game: when a subset of players form an agreement, it is possible that the payo®s they
can obtain are less than the payo®s that are feasible in the absence of the agreement;
thus, the fallback position may involve higher payo®s than are possible in the presence
of the agreement itself. It is true that, if this is the case, then the corresponding
agreement structure could never be stable according to our de¯nition. Nevertheless,
in order to apply our de¯nition of blocking and stability, a payo® distribution must
be de¯ned for all agreement structures, even those that are not stable. To deal with
such cases, we can apply the bargaining function B \in reverse" by taking the cum-
agreement scenario as de¯ning the (endogenously determined) disagreement point and
14The more general case can be formally described as follows. Let Z ´ fg µ Sg, X be a partition
of Z with A 2 X representing an element of this partition; de¯ne A(g) ´ fG 2 G j g 2 A;AT G 6= ;g,
and ·G(g) ´ G ¡ A(g). Also, let G¤(G) denote the set of stable agreement structures given G as the
(possibly restricted) set of feasible agreement structures, and ~G¤ : fGg 7! G be a mapping which selects
one speci¯c structure from a set (with fGg representing a collection of sets). Then, under a symmetric
bargaining rule, behaviour can be de¯ned in the following way: for a given restricted set of agreement
structures G, each agreement g 2 G 2 G, chooses ¾g 2 §g so as to maximize B(¼i ¡ ¼Dgi (G); i 2 Ig),
where ¼Dgi (G) = ¼i(¾^( ~G¤(G ¡ ·G(g)))). Note that such a de¯nition recursively invokes the de¯nition
of stability for a structure within a certain restricted set of structures, and is therefore intertwined
with De¯nitions 8 and 9: in order to determine the payo® distribution within an agreement in a
certain structure, it is necessary to determine which structure would be stable if the structures in
A(g) were eliminated; in turn this determination may require knowledge of the payo® distribution
within a certain agreement g0 in alternative structures, which then may require identifying a further
stable outcome in a game where further both the structures in A(g) and in A(g)0 are ruled out; and
so on. The simple version of this construct we use in Section 4 assumes X to consist of the single
element Z.
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the stable no-agreement scenario as de¯ning the (exogenously determined) bargaining
outcome.15
Some remarks are in order at this point with respect to the feasibility of side
payments. The agreement formation game as we have formalized it above does not
rule out the possibility of side payments, if feasible. Side payments can be formally
treated just like additional dimensions of players' strategies, which become active only
within agreements in which the corresponding elementary players participate. In the
game so augmented, all of the previous de¯nitions would still apply, both in the general
case and in the case of a bargaining-based payo® distribution rule within agreements.
3 Issue Linkage vs. Issue Tie-in
The multi-dimensional agreement formation game described in the previous section
naturally involves issue linkage, i.e. players can cooperate over multiple dimensions
and bargain across di®erent issues. Such cooperation and exchange may involve the
formation of perfectly overlapping agreement structures (i.e. coalitions of player in the
standard sense) or only partially overlapping structures (with subsets of players co-
operating over certain issues but not others). A negotiation tie-in rule, requiring that
countries must form joint agreements over multiple issues|coalitions in the usual sense
of the term|eliminates the possibility of partially overlapping agreement structures,
which a®ects both the feasible proposals as well as the feasible objections to a given pro-
posal. The question we want to address here is the following: what are the implications
of a tie-in rule for the stability of the Joint Global Agreement (JGA), J ´ ffSgg|the
agreement structure where all players jointly cooperate over all strategic dimensions?
Formally, let G^ the set of partitions of S which are coarser than P (where P is the
partition of S whose elements are the sets S(i), i 2 I).
De¯nition 10 A perfectly overlapping agreement structure is an element of G^. A
15In a scenario with symmetric players, it is possible to abstract from this problem by simply
assigning equal payo®s to identical players, which may nevertheless result in lower payo®s when a
certain agreement is present than without it. Even in this case, however, the use of an equal-payo®
rule would imply the application of a symmetric bargaining rule, where the disagreement point is
de¯ned as the payo® distribution which results in a structure where the agreement in question does
take place.
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partially overlapping agreement structure is an element of G ¡ G^.
A negotiation tie-in rule restricts agreements to lie in G^. Note that since the JGA
belongs to G^, it is not ruled out by a tie-in restriction. Nevertheless, such a tie-in
restriction may a®ect the stability of the JGA as it a®ects the set of feasible objections
and counterobjections.
Suppose that, without a tie-in restriction, the set of feasible agreement structures
is simply ¹G = G, and let the sets of Stable Agreement Structures with and without
a tie-in restriction be respectively denoted as GR and GU . Then, theoretically four
possibilities arise: (i) J 2 GR T GU ; (ii) J 2 GR¡³GR T GU´; (iii) J 2 GU ¡³GR T GU´;
(iv) J 62 GR T GU . In cases (i) and (iv), a tie-in restriction is irrelevant for the stability
of the JGA: in case (i) it is stable with or without a tie-in restriction, whereas in (iv) it
is unstable under both scenarios. In case (ii), a tie-in restriction makes J stable when
it would not be otherwise; in case (iii) it makes J unstable.
The implicit, informal presumption in the policy debate seems to be that tie-in could
\help" cooperation, by forcing asymmetric countries to trade concessions across di®er-
ent issues and by o®setting free-riding incentives.16 The broad idea behind our counter
argument is that what matters for countries to be persuaded to cooperate across all
issues is that cross-trading be possible out of equilibrium, not that it be required . In
other words, the idea of cross-issue trade focuses on within-coalitions bargains, but the
formation of an agreement (and the associated bargaining that takes place within it) is
an equilibrium phenomenon, which may or may not occur depending on whether other
arrangements can be opposed as objections. From this point of view, the e®ect of a
tie-in rule is, in principle, ambiguous: it could either make the JGA stable|by elimi-
nating a partially overlapping agreement structures that would otherwise constitute a
stable objection to it as in case (ii) above|make the JGA unstable|by eliminating
a partially overlapping agreement structure that would otherwise make a certain per-
fectly overlapping structure unstable as an objection as in case (iii) above|or, ¯nally,
have no e®ect.
To illustrate these ideas, consider the following stylized example. There are three
players 1, 2, and 3. Player 1 has two elementary strategies, denoted as A1 and B1,
16For example, Carraro and Siniscalco (1994) point out that free-riding incentives could be o®set
by making the signing of agreements entailing positive excludable externalities restricted to signatory
countries (e.g. trade or R&D agreements) conditional on environmental cooperation.
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while players 2 and 3 have only one elementary strategy each, denoted respectively
as A2 and A3. Suppose that to each agreement structure corresponds only one non-
cooperative equilibrium, and that payo®s under the JGA, J = ffA1; B1;A2; A3gg are
¼i = 3; i 2 f1; 2; 3g.
Consider ¯rst a scenario where ¼i = 3; i 2 f1; 2; 3g in the JGA, ¼1 = ¼2 = 4, ¼3 = 0
under G1 = ffA1;A2g; fB1g; fA3gg, and ¼i = 1; i 2 f1; 2; 3g in all other agreement
structures. Then if, under a tie-in restriction, G1 is ruled out, J is stable, whereas if it
is feasible, players 1 and 2 can block J by putting forward G1, which in turn cannot be
blocked by any agreement structure. Here, negotiation tie-in helps support multilateral
cooperation.
Consider next a scenario where the agreement structureG2 = ffA1; B1; A2g; fA3gg|
the structure where players 1 and 2 form a coalition|yields payo®s ¼1 = ¼2 = 4; ¼3 = 0,
and all perfectly overlapping structures other than J and G2 yield ¼i = 1; i 2 f1; 2; 3g.
Since both players 1 and 2 are better o® under G2 than under J , the con¯guration G2
could in principle constitute a blocking objection to J for them. It remains to be seen
whetherG2 itself is stable with respect to restricted counterobjections (objections made
by ¯ner blocking coalitions). The only candidate counterobjections by subsets of the ob-
jecting coalition f1; 2g are G3 = ffA1; B1g; fA2g; fA3gg, G4 = ffA1; A2g; fB1g;fA3gg,
and G5 = ffA1g; fB1g; fA2g; fA3gg. Under a tie-in restriction, however, G4 and G5
are infeasible. Suppose that, under G3 and G5, we have ¼i = 1, while under G4 we
have ¼1 = 5, ¼2 = 1, ¼3 = 0. Then, if G3 is the only possible counterobjection to G2,
the latter will be a stable objection to J , and therefore J will not be stable. If, on
the other hand, there is no tie-in restriction, G4 and G5 are feasible counterobjections,
and player 1 can block G2 by putting forward G4|which is itself stable, since G5, the
only possible counterobjection to G4, yields a lower payo® for player 2 than G4 does,
and player 2 obtains a lower payo® under G4 than under J . Thus, without a tie-in
restriction, G2 is not a stable objection to J, and J is therefore stable. In this scenario,
a tie-in restriction hinders multilateral cooperation.
Notice that issue linkage can still be at work in the same scenario. Suppose, for
example, that countries were forced to coordinate over di®erent issues separately|
which would rule out both G2 and J (as well as all the agreement structures involving
the elementary player B1 and any other player)|and that G6 = ffA1; A2;A3g; fB1gg
(a multilateral agreement over a single dimension) yields payo®s ¼i = 0; i 2 f1; 2; 3g.
Then multilateral cooperation over the ¯rst policy dimension would not be possible
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unless the other dimension is also brought in.
Whether a tie-in restriction will help or hinder multilateral cooperation therefore
depends on the payo® structure of the underlying noncooperative game. In the next
section, we describe a policy game involving both trade and environmental policies|
based on a competitive model of international trade with internationally di®erentiated
goods and transboundary pollution|which we then use to examine the implications
of negotiation tie-in across trade and environmental policies for the stability of multi-
lateral, joint trade-and-environment policy agreements.
4 An Application to Trade and Environmental
Policy Negotiations
Much of the literature on international policy cooperation has separately examined co-
operation over trade policies and over environmental policies. Riezman (1985), Krug-
man (1991), Bond and Syropoulos (1993), and Yi (1996), among others, have focused
on the creation of Customs Unions, while Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994)
and Chander ad Tulkens (1992), among others, have focused on International Envi-
ronmental Agreements. The broad theme emerging from this literature is that the
presence of spillovers between coalitions (positive in the case of environmental coali-
tions, negative in the case of trade coalitions) makes global cooperation di±cult to
sustain, and that partial cooperation, restricted to subsets of countries, is more likely
to emerge.
In this context, it has been suggested that multilateral cooperation could be en-
hanced by formally combining di®erent issues with the aim of joint settlement. In the
following, the ideas developed in the preceding sections will be used to examine for-
mally the question of whether negotiation tie-in across trade and environmental policy
issues would help or hinder multilateral cooperation. For this purpose, we describe a
three-country model of international trade with transboundary pollution.17
17It can be argued that, in the absence of a supranational authority with autonomous powers of
e®ective enforcement, it is not legitimate to assume international commitments to be binding, and that
therefore all international agreements must be self-enforcing. This type of approach to the analysis
of international trade agreements, using an in¯nitely repeated game paradigm, has been pursued,
among others, by Bagwell and Staiger (1997). Note, however, that the structure of incentives that
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4.1 International Trade with Transboundary Pollution
Three ex-ante symmetric countries, 1, 2 and 3, are linked by transboundary pollution
and trade, with markets for traded goods being characterized by perfect competition.
Environmental emissions are \global", i.e. countries are equally a®ected by foreign and
domestic emissions. Each country i 2 I ´ f1; 2; 3g is endowed with an amount ¹Mi
of a non-traded good. In each country, ¯rms in the tradeable goods sector produce a
single good at a constant marginal cost c = 1 in terms of the nontraded good. Markets
are assumed to be segmented, in the sense that consumers in each country view goods
produced in di®erent countries as being imperfect substitutes.
Consumers are identical, and the preferences of the representative consumer in
country k 2 I are described by a quasilinear, isoelastic utility function:
uk(Mk;Qk) ´Mk + ¯1 + 1=´Q
1+1=´
k ¡ ±1 + 1=µD
1+1=µ; k 2 I; (1)
where Mk is consumption of the nontraded good, Qk is composite consumption of the
traded goods|an isoelastic aggregation of the quantities qik produced in country i
(origin) and consumed by country k (destination), i.e.
Qk =
24(1 ¡ ¹)1=°q(°¡1)=°kk + (¹=2)1=°X
i 6=k
q(°¡1)=°ik
35°=(°¡1) ; (2)
with ° representing the elasticity of substitution in consumption between traded goods
from di®erent sources, and ¹ representing the share of imports in total tradeables
demand|´ < 0 is the (constant) elasticity of demand for the tradeables aggregate, ¯
is a positive scalar, D are global emissions, µ > 0 is the (constant) inverse elasticity of
marginal damage valuation with respect to global emissions, and ± is a positive scalar.
Demand for the traded aggregate in country k is then given by
Qk = [pk=(¯mk)]´ ; k 2 I; (3)
where
pk =
24(1 ¡ ¹)w1¡°kk + (¹=2)X
i 6=k
w1¡°ik
351=(1¡°) ; k 2 I; (4)
makes cooperation sustainable by threat of punishment in a repeated game ¯nds a counterpart in the
sequence of objections and counterobjections in our static solution concept. On the other hand, since
punishment strategies in a repeated game can be arbitrarily selective, such correspondence would be
weakened if only multi-issue agreements were included.
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mk is the price of the nontraded good in country k, and wik is the consumer price in
country k of goods imported from country i. Using Shephard's Lemma, we can write
uncompensated demands for imports and domestic demand for domestically produced
tradeables as
qik =
Ã
pk
¯mk
!´
®ik
µ pk
wik
¶°
; i 2 I; k 2 I; (5)
where ®ik = ¹=2; i = k, and ®kk = 1 ¡ ¹; i 6= k.
Production of the traded good in country i generates environmental emissions that
are proportional to output by a certain ¯xed factor, the same for all countries, which,
without loss of generality can be assumed to be equal to unity. Global emission are
then simply
D ´ X
ik
qik; k 2 I; (6)
We restrict the government in country k to the use of only two policy instruments:
ad valorem output taxes (ek)|which, since emissions are proportional to output, are
equivalent to emission taxes|and discriminatory, ad valorem imports tari®s (tik). Tax
and tari® revenues are returned to consumers in a lump-sum fashion.
Domestic demand for nontradeables is
Mi =
mi ¹Mi +
P
k[eimiqik + tkimk(1 + ek)qki] ¡ piQi
mi
; i 2 I: (7)
Market clearing then requires
Mi +
X
k
qik ¡ ¹Mi = 0; i 2 I: (8)
Zero-pro¯ts for the tradeable goods sector in country i require that the gross-of-tari®,
gross-of-tax, consumer price of imports from i by k must be
wik = mi(1 + ei)(1 + tik); i; k 2 I: (9)
For the purpose of our analysis, countries' payo®s are de¯ned as the sum of consumer
surplus, and tari® and tax revenues, minus environmental damage, which is in turn
equal to the di®erence between utility and the endowment ¹Mi:
¼i = ui(Mi; Qi) ¡ ¹Mi: i 2 I: (10)
This is simply a re-normalization of utility, which involves no loss of generality.
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4.2 Feasible Agreement Structures
As discussed in Section 2, it is useful to rede¯ne the game in terms of six elementary
players, by breaking up each country i into two smaller players|its trade and envi-
ronment \ministers"|denoted respectively as Ti and Ei, who share the same payo®
function, but control each trade and environmental policy for country i, respectively.
Note that in this setting there exist a unique welfare-maximizing combination of
trade and environmental taxes in each country i 2 I , for any given combination of taxes
in the other countries,18 this combination being a solution for the ¯rst-order conditions
@¼i=@tik = 0; k 2 I, and @¼i=@ei = 0. In turn these conditions are equivalent to best-
response conditions obtained by maximizing ¼i separately by choice of tik; k 2 I, and
ei, i.e. the conditions that characterize behaviour for two separate elementary players.
In other words, in this setting, there is no direct gain for an individual player from
coordinating choices across di®erent policy dimensions. Thus, for example, agreement
structures involving the single element fT1;E1g and structures involving the separate
elements fT1g;fE1g will yield the same payo®s for all players.
For the purpose of our analysis|and consistently with observed practice|we shall
restrict feasible agreement structures to those which involve only one policy dimension
or both, i.e. trade-only agreements, environment-only agreements and combined agree-
ments, thus ruling out mixed agreements where a country coordinates its trade policy
with another country's environmental policies. Note, however, that the same equiv-
alence of single-player optimal choice and elementary players' best responses applies
here with respect to single-issue and two-issue agreements involving the same players,
implying that we need not separately consider structures featuring joint agreements.19
In other words, two separate agreements over trade and environmental policies re-
spectively between two players are here the same as a joint (perfectly overlapping)
18The payo® ¼i is concave in ei and tik.
19If, for example, two countries sign a trade agreement, their trade ministers will set trade taxes in a
cooperative manner, taking as given the environmental taxes chosen by their respective environmental
ministers. If the two countries sign an environmental agreement, their environmental ministers will
set environmental taxes taking as given the trade taxes chosen by their respective trade ministers. If
they sign both, all ministers will behave just as they would under each separate agreement, and this
will entail no coordination failure.
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agreement between the same two players.
With six elementary players and two strategy dimensions|and given the restric-
tion imposed on the set of feasible agreement structures and the equivalence property
discussed above|we need to consider twenty-¯ve possible agreement structures, which,
given the symmetry assumption, can be restricted to the following ten:
1. Joint Global Agreement (JGA):
ffT1; T2; T3g; fE1; E2;E3gg;
2. No agreement on either issue:
ffT1g; fT2g; fT3g; fE1g; fE2g; fE3gg;
3. Global trade agreement, no environmental agreement:
ffT1; T2; T3g; fE1g; fE2g; fE3gg;
4. Global environmental agreement, no trade agreement:
ffT1g; fT2g; fT3g; fE1; E2; E3gg;
5. Partial environmental agreement, no trade agreement:
ffT1g; fT2g; fT3g; fE1g; fE2; E3gg;
6. Partial trade agreement, no environmental agreement:
ffT1g; fT2; T3g; fE1g;fE2g; fE3gg;
7. Partial perfectly overlapping agreements on trade and environment:
ffT1g; fT2; T3g; fE1g;fE2; E3gg;
8. Partial agreements on trade and environment:
ffT1g; fT2; T3g; fE1; E2g; fE3gg;
9. Global trade agreement and partial environmental agreement:
ffT1; T2; T3g; fE1g; fE2; E3gg;
10. Global environmental agreement and partial trade agreement:
ffT1g; fT2; T3g; fE1; E2; E3gg.
The presence of a tie-in restriction only leaves the perfectly overlapping agreement
structures 1, 2 and 7|and all symmetrically corresponding con¯gurations|as feasible
agreement structures.
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4.3 Negotiation Tie-in and the Stability of the Joint Global
Agreement
If we apply the equilibrium concept described in Section 2 to this environment, we can
state the following:
Proposition 1 A tie-in negotiation rule makes an otherwise unstable JGA stable if
and only if: (a) under a tie-in restriction, no perfectly overlapping structure put forward
by a coalition of one or more countries can block the JGA; and (b) when all agreement
structures are feasible, a partially overlapping agreement structure is a stable objection
to the JGA.
In our three-country example, the conditions of Proposition 1 become:
(a) ¼1i > ¼2i and ¼1i > ¼7¤i 8i, where 7¤ indicates agreement structure 7 and its mirror
images;
(b.1) Within the set of partially overlapping agreement structures that a single country
j could put forward as objections to the JGA (including agreement structures 5, 6, 9
and 10 and their mirror images), there is at least one structures G0 for which: (i)
¼G0j > ¼1j ; and (ii) within the set of agreement structures that the other two countries
k and h can put forward as counterobjections to G0, there is no structure G00 such that
¼G00k ¸ ¼G0k and ¼G00h ¸ ¼G0h (with at least one inequality being strict); and/or
(b.2) Within the set of partially overlapping agreement structures that two countries
k and h can put forward as objections to the JGA (including agreement structures 3,
4, 5, 6 and 8 and their mirror images), there is at least one structures G0 for which: (i)
¼G0k ¸ ¼1k and ¼G0h ¸ ¼1h (with at least one inequality being strict); and (ii) within the
set of agreement structures that a third country j can put forward as counterobjections
to G0, there is no structure G00 such that ¼G00j > ¼G
0
j .
Proposition 2 A tie-in negotiation rule makes an otherwise stable JGA unstable if
only if: (a) under a tie-in restriction, a perfectly overlapping agreement structure is
a stable objection to the JGA by a coalition of one or more players; and (b) when all
agreement structures are feasible, there is no stable objection to the JGA.
In our three-country example, the conditions of Proposition 2 are:
(a) ¼7¤j > ¼1j and ¼7k¤ = ¼7¤h > ¼2k = ¼2h, where 7¤ indicates structure 7 and its mirror
images;
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(b.1) Within the set of partially overlapping agreement structures that two countries
k and h could put forward as counterobjections to 7¤ (including agreement structures
5 and 6 and their mirror images), consider the agreement structure, G0, that yields the
highest payo® for countries k and h. Then it must be true that (i) ¼G0k = ¼G
0
h > ¼7¤k =
¼7¤h ; and (ii) ¼G
0
j < ¼1j ; and
(b.2) No partially overlapping agreement structures (including agreement structures 3,
4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10 and their mirror images) is a stable objection to the JGA.
Which of the above scenarios will apply (if any) depends on several factors. If we
take the trade policy side in isolation (i.e. set ± = 0), with three symmetric countries,
two countries always gain when forming a trade bloc with coordinated tari® setting
(a Customs Union) in comparison with a no-coordination scenario (see, for example,
Kennan and Riezman, 1990); furthermore the excluded country always gain from a
move to free trade from a two-country bloc situation. In such a setting, the gains
from forming a two-country bloc to the participating countries, and the cost of such
move to the excluded country, increase with the importance of trade as re°ected in the
magnitude of ¹.
On the environmental policy side, leaving trade aside (i.e. setting ¹ = 0), the in-
centives for one country to leave the global environmental agreement and free ride on
a partial coordination agreement between the other two, other things equal, increase
with the size of the damage and decreases with the elasticity of environmental policy
responses to changes in marginal damage valuation, which in turn depends primarily
on µ (the lower µ the easier it is to free ride), but also on the parameters directly
a®ecting tradeables demand. The value of the inverse elasticity of marginal dam-
age valuation (corresponding to the elasticity of abatement demand with respect to
marginal damage) also determines whether two countries have an incentive to engage
in partial cooperation over environmental policy if the other country does not par-
ticipate: as environmental policy responses become more inelastic, free-riding by the
non-participating country can become so severe as to make noncooperation preferable
for the remaining two. This is a well-known result and a theme that runs through the
literature on environmental agreement formation.20
20See, for example, Barrett (1994).
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Note, however, that in this model emissions abatement can only take place through a
reduction in the production of tradeables; this means that emission taxes coincide with
output taxes, which are a relatively close substitute for export taxes (and, equivalently,
import tari®s), and that in turn import tari®s are a substitute for emission taxes
with respect to environmental policy goals. Consequently, the e®ects of trade and
environmental policy instruments on payo®s are not additive, and thus trade policy
and environmental policy incentives cannot be separated in as clearcut a manner as
the above discussion suggests. In particular, as ¹ approaches unity, import tari®s and
emission taxes become progressively more equivalent.
To illustrate the potential e®ects of a negotiation tie-in restriction, below we present
four di®erent examples, involving alternative parameterizations of the model. We focus
on a scenario with a symmetric bargaining-based distribution rule within agreements.
In the present model, even if countries are ex-ante identical, asymmetric payo® distri-
butions could still arise between two participants to an agreement if they do not also
participate in the same agreements outside the given one (as in agreement structures
8-10)|a complication that is absent in one-dimensional agreement formation games.
We consider alternative bargaining rules: Utilitarian bargaining (B(¼i ¡ ¼Di ; i 2 Ig) =P
i2Ig(¼i ¡ ¼Di )) and Nash bargaining (B(¼i ¡ ¼Di ; i 2 Ig) = Qi2Ig(¼i ¡ ¼Di )) without
side payments,21 and the case with side payments under a symmetric, strictly concave
B.22 In all cases the disagreement point for bargaining is given by the payo®s under
structure 2.
Tables 1 to 4 report noncooperative equilibrium payo®s under utilitarian bargaining
under each of the ten agreement structures described in the previous subsection, for
di®erent parameterizations.23 In all cases we set ¯ = 2=3, ± = 4=3, ´ = ¡3=2, and
21Note that, with quasilinear preferences, lump-sum transfers and utility transfers are equivalent.
Transferable utility, however, does not imply that transfers need be feasible. Side payments are hardly
observed in the practice of international agreements, perhaps because it is di±cult or, in view of future
commitments, undesirable to arrive at a precise determination of willingness to pay.
22With side payments and a symmetric disagreement point, any symmetric, strictly concave B will
always yield an egalitarian outcome, i.e. identical payo® for all players. With a utilitarian B and side
payments, on the other hand, the payo® distribution is indeterminate.
23Since no closed-form solutions for payo®s as a function of policies are available, we have used
numerical methods to obtain the noncooperative payo® values.
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° = 2, and vary only the values of ¹ and µ. Equilibrium policy levels (not reported)
range from zero to 2 for import tari®s and from 0.4 to 2 for emission taxes.
Consider ¯rst the scenario in Table 1, in which a large share of tradeable goods is
imported (¹ = 63=100) and the inverse marginal damage valuation elasticity is large
(µ = 3=2). It is easy to verify that the JGA is stable if a tie-in rule is imposed: no
subset of players is better o® at 2 or 7 than at 1. In contrast, without tie-in the JGA
can be blocked by country 1 putting forward structure 9: this is a stable objection,
since all the possible counterobjections by 2 and 3 (structures 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and the
mirror image of structure 824) yield a lower payo® for them.
In this scenario, the imposition of a tie-in negotiation rule facilitates multilateral
cooperation over trade and environmental policies (case (ii) of Section 3), by removing
the possibility of pro¯table single-issue deviations|by a single country with respect to
environmental policy, and by a partial alliance of two countries with respect to trade
policy. With µ large, two countries prefer partial environmental policy cooperation
between themselves to full noncooperation. This implies that, if a country attempts to
free ride on environmental policy, the other two countries cannot credibly counter the
move by resolving not to cooperate among themselves. At the same time, the gains
from forming a trade bloc against a third country, for the two countries involved, and
the cost of being excluded from a trade bloc, are sizeable (¹ is large). This implies
that, with a tie-in restriction, a single country would not ¯nd it pro¯table to exit from
a multilateral cooperation agreement.
Consider next a scenario where all parameters are the same as in Table 1 but
the inverse elasticity of marginal damage valuation is lower (Table 2). Although the
incentive to move to structure 9 still exists for countries 1, this deviation would not be
stable whether or not a tie-in restriction is present, because countries 2 and 3 would
counterobject to it by moving to structure 3 where they obtain a higher payo® by not
coordinating on environmental policy and where country 1 obtains a lower payo® in
comparison with structure 1. Thus, in this scenario tie-in is irrelevant, because even
without it the JGA would be stable (case (i) of Section 3).
Let us now consider the scenario depicted in Table 3, in which both the import share
parameter and the inverse elasticity of marginal damage valuation are small (¹ = 1=10,
24The relevant mirror image of structure 8 is one in which countries 1 and 2 cooperate over trade
and countries 2 and 3 over environment, yielding ¼1 = 0:704, ¼2 = 0:668 and ¼3 = 0:656.
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Table 1: Agreement Structures and Countries' Payo®s
¹ = 63=100, µ = 3=2, ° = 2, ´ = ¡3=2, ¯ = 2=3, ± = 4=3
Agreement Structure Countries' Payo®s (¼1, ¼2, ¼3)
1: ffT1; T2; T3g; fE1; E2;E3gg (0.722, 0.722, 0.722)
2: ffT1g; fT2g; fT3g; fE1g; fE2g; fE3gg (0.656, 0.656, 0.656)
3: ffT1; T2; T3g; fE1g; fE2g; fE3gg (0.696, 0.696, 0.696)
4: ffT1g; fT2g; fT3g; fE1;E2; E3gg (0.700, 0.700, 0.700)
5: ffT1g; fT2g; fT3g; fE1g; fE2; E3gg (0.703, 0.667, 0.667)
6: ffT1g; fT2; T3g; fE1g; fE2g; fE3gg (0.607, 0.692, 0.692)
7: ffT1g; fT2; T3g; fE1g; fE2; E3gg (0.642, 0.695, 0.695)
8: ffT1g; fT2; T3g; fE1; E2g; fE3gg (0.656, 0.668, 0.704)
9: ffT1; T2; T3g; fE1g; fE2; E3gg (0.742, 0.697, 0.697)
10: ffT1g; fT2; T3g; fE1; E2; E3gg (0.656, 0.716, 0.716)
Table 2: Agreement Structures and Countries' Payo®s
¹ = 63=100, µ = 3=4, ° = 2, ´ = ¡3=2, ¯ = 2=3, ± = 4=3
Agreement Structure Countries' Payo®s (¼1, ¼2, ¼3)
1: ffT1; T2; T3g; fE1; E2;E3gg (0.824, 0.824, 0.824)
2: ffT1g; fT2g; fT3g; fE1g; fE2g; fE3gg (0.764, 0.764, 0.764)
3: ffT1; T2; T3g; fE1g; fE2g; fE3gg (0.812, 0.812, 0.812)
4: ffT1g; fT2g; fT3g; fE1;E2; E3gg (0.793, 0.793, 0.793)
5: ffT1g; fT2g; fT3g; fE1g; fE2; E3gg (0.794, 0.771, 0.771)
6: ffT1g; fT2; T3g; fE1g; fE2g; fE3gg (0.717, 0.803, 0.803)
7: ffT1g; fT2; T3g; fE1g; fE2; E3gg (0.735, 0.803, 0.803)
8: ffT1g; fT2; T3g; fE1; E2g; fE3gg (0.764, 0.793, 0.793)
9: ffT1; T2; T3g; fE1g; fE2; E3gg (0.838, 0.810, 0.810)
10: ffT1g; fT2; T3g; fE1; E2; E3gg (0.764, 0.805, 0.805)
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Table 3: Agreement Structures and Countries' Payo®s
¹ = 1=10, µ = 2=5, ° = 2, ´ = ¡3=2, ¯ = 2=3, ± = 4=3
Agreement Structure Countries' Payo®s (¼1, ¼2, ¼3)
1: ffT1; T2; T3g; fE1; E2;E3gg (0.907, 0.907, 0.907)
2: ffT1g; fT2g; fT3g; fE1g; fE2g; fE3gg (0.863, 0.863, 0.863)
3: ffT1; T2; T3g; fE1g; fE2g; fE3gg (0.870, 0.870, 0.870)
4: ffT1g; fT2g; fT3g; fE1;E2; E3gg (0.902, 0.902, 0.902)
5: ffT1g; fT2g; fT3g; fE1g; fE2; E3gg (0.928, 0.862, 0.862)
6: ffT1g; fT2; T3g; fE1g; fE2g; fE3gg (0.859, 0.868, 0.868)
7: ffT1g; fT2; T3g; fE1g; fE2; E3gg (0.923, 0.866, 0.866)
8: ffT1g; fT2; T3g; fE1; E2g; fE3gg (0.862, 0.863, 0.933)
9: ffT1; T2; T3g; fE1g; fE2; E3gg (0.936, 0.867, 0.867)
10: ffT1g; fT2; T3g; fE1; E2; E3gg (0.897, 0.905, 0.905)
Table 4: Agreement Structures and Countries' Payo®s
¹ = 1=10, µ = 4=5, ° = 2, ´ = ¡3=2, ¯ = 2=3, ± = 4=3
Agreement Structure Countries' Payo®s (¼1, ¼2, ¼3)
1: ffT1; T2; T3g; fE1; E2;E3gg (0.815, 0.815, 0.815)
2: ffT1g; fT2g; fT3g; fE1g; fE2g; fE3gg (0.749, 0.749, 0.749)
3: ffT1; T2; T3g; fE1g; fE2g; fE3gg (0.754, 0.754, 0.754)
4: ffT1g; fT2g; fT3g; fE1;E2; E3gg (0.811, 0.811, 0.811)
5: ffT1g; fT2g; fT3g; fE1g; fE2; E3gg (0.840, 0.756, 0.756)
6: ffT1g; fT2; T3g; fE1g; fE2g; fE3gg (0.744, 0.753, 0.753)
7: ffT1g; fT2; T3g; fE1g; fE2; E3gg (0.834, 0.759, 0.759)
8: ffT1g; fT2; T3g; fE1; E2g; fE3gg (0.751, 0.759, 0.845)
9: ffT1; T2; T3g; fE1g; fE2; E3gg (0.847, 0.760, 0.760)
10: ffT1g; fT2; T3g; fE1; E2; E3gg (0.806, 0.814, 0.814)
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µ = 2=5). Recall that under a tie-in restriction only agreement structures 1, 2 and 7
(and its mirror images) are feasible. Country 1 now bene¯ts from moving from 1 to 7,
because the costs of forgoing trade cooperation are low and more than o®set by the gains
from free-riding on environmental cooperation. Under a tie-in constraint, countries 2
and 3 are unable to counterobject, since their payo® under structure 2 is lower than
under structure 7; hence structure 7 constitutes a stable objection to the JGA. If, on
the other hand, there is no tie-in restriction, structure 6 is a stable counterobjection
to 7 there is no tie-in restriction, structure 6 is a stable counterobjection to 7 (under
6 players 2 and 3 obtain a higher payo® than under 7, and player 1 obtains a lower
payo® than under 1). Thus, without a tie-in restriction, structure 7 is not a stable
objection by player 1 to the JGA. Removing a tie-in restriction introduces structure 9
as a possible objection, but this also is unstable.
In this scenario, a tie-in negotiation rule hinders multilateral cooperation over trade
and environmental policies (case (iii) of Section 3), because it removes the ability for
two countries to e®ectively counter single-country objections. With µ small, if a country
chooses not to participate in a multilateral environmental agreement, the two remaining
countries are better o® if they cease environmental cooperation among themselves.
This means that free-riding attempts by a single country could be credibly countered
by a move to trade policy-only cooperation between the remaining two. With a tie-in
restriction, however, the incentives for two countries to keep cooperating along the
trade policy dimension override their incentives to split along the environmental policy
dimension, making single-country objections stable and the JGA unstable.
In the case represented in Table 4, all the parameters are as in Table 3, except for the
inverse marginal damage elasticity µ, which is now higher. Under a tie-in restriction,
country 1 still bene¯ts from moving from 1 to 7, which remains a stable deviation
from the JGA. Now, however, even without a tie-in restriction, this objection cannot
be countered by structure 6, since countries 2 and 3 no longer bene¯t from splitting
a partial environmental agreement. This is because a higher µ implies positive net
bene¯ts from partial environmental cooperation compared with the noncooperative
outcome.25 In this scenario tie-in is irrelevant, because even without it the JGA would
25Note, however, that a higher µ also implies a smaller di®erence in the net bene¯ts between partial
environmental cooperation and no cooperation. This is in the line with the results of Barrett (1994),
who shows that international environmental agreements can be self-enforcing only when they can
25
be unstable (case (iv) of Section 3).
Table 5 shows payo®s for the asymmetric structures 8, 9 and 10, and their mirror
images, under alternative bargaining rules|Utilitarian and Nash bargaining without
side payments and symmetric bargaining with side payments|in each of the four
parameterizations. Payo®s in structures 1-7 are una®ected. Results remain the same
in some scenarios but change in others. Under Nash bargaining and bargaining with
side payments, tie-in becomes irrelevant in the ¯rst parameterization (as in Table 1),
since structure 9 is no longer attractive for player 1 in comparison to the JGA. Under
the third parameter con¯guration (as in Table 3), a tie-in restriction makes the JGA
unstable in both the Utilitarian case without side payments and the case with side
payments; with Nash bargaining without any restrictions structure 7 is not a stable
objection as in the other two cases, but structure 9 becomes a stable objection to
the JGA. Changing bargaining rules makes no di®erence in the second and fourth
parameterizations.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have described an analytical framework for investigating policy co-
ordination choices when players can enter into selective and separate agreements with
di®erent partners along di®erent policy dimensions. We have then applied our model
of multi-dimensional agreement formation to the study of trade and environmental
negotiations between three symmetric countries, focusing on the e®ects of a tie-in ne-
gotiation rule for the stability of multilateral cooperation over trade and environmental
policies.
Multilateral cooperation over environmental policy is hindered by an individual
country's incentive to free ride on a partial environmental agreement formed by the
other two, while trade cooperation is undermined by the incentive for two countries
to form a trade bloc against a third country. It has been suggested that one way to
o®set free-riding incentives and help sustain more cooperation would be to make trade
cooperation conditional on environmental cooperation.26 To do so, countries should
marginally improve upon the noncooperative outcome.
26This idea is implicit in the proposal for an International Agreement on Trade and Environment
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Table 5: Countries' Payo®s under Alternative Bargaining Rules
° = 2, ´ = ¡3=2, ¯ = 2=3, ± = 4=3
Structure Countries' Payo®s (¼1, ¼2, ¼3)
Utilitarian Nash Side Payments
¹ = 63=100, µ = 3=2
8 (0.656, 0.668, 0.704) (0.656, 0.656, 0.656) (0.685, 0.685, 0.685)
9 (0.742, 0.697, 0.697) (0.716, 0.712, 0.712) (0.712, 0.712, 0.712)
10 (0.656, 0.716, 0.716) (0.677, 0.702, 0.702) (0.697, 0.697, 0.697)
¹ = 63=100, µ = 3=4
8 (0.764, 0.793, 0.793) (0.760, 0.766, 0.769) (0.786, 0.786, 0.786)
9 (0.838, 0.810, 0.810) (0.822, 0.819, 0.819) (0.820, 0.820, 0.820)
10 (0.764, 0.805, 0.805) (0.773, 0.798, 0.798) (0.793, 0.793, 0.793)
¹ = 1=10, µ = 2=5
8 (0.862, 0.863, 0.933) (0.864, 0.864, 0.918) (0.886, 0.886, 0.886)
9 (0.936, 0.867, 0.867) (0.917, 0.875, 0.875) (0.890, 0.890, 0.890)
10 (0.897, 0.905, 0.905) (0.901, 0.903, 0.903) (0.902, 0.902, 0.902)
¹ = 1=10, µ = 4=5
8 (0.751, 0.759, 0.845) (0.758, 0.759, 0.832) (0.785, 0.785, 0.785)
9 (0.847, 0.760, 0.760) (0.828, 0.768, 0.768) (0.789, 0.789, 0.789)
10 (0.806, 0.814, 0.814) (0.810, 0.812, 0.812) (0.811, 0.811, 0.811)
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commit to a tie-in restriction on international negotiations, which would rule out the
possibility of signing single-issue agreements. Formally, such a restriction could be
thought of as emerging in an initial constitutional stage in which countries can credibly
commit to a certain negotiation process.
Our analysis shows that conditionality could indeed play a positive role, by elimi-
nating stable objections to the JGA. But in some cases negotiation tie-in could actu-
ally become a hurdle to multilateral cooperation, by making an otherwise stable JGA
unstable. If this is the more likely scenario, the policy implication would be that con-
ditionality should be rejected in favour of a °exible system where countries remain free
to decide whether to negotiate multiple-issue agreements or single-issue agreements
containing clauses that make them compatible with other agreements (e.g. trade rules
allowing countries to use trade remedies against countries that are in violation of a
formally separate environmental agreement).
Our results also suggest that conditionality can only play a positive role with respect
to \small" environmental problems (small in terms of the associated welfare costs and
bene¯ts in comparison with the costs and bene¯ts of trade policies), but is more likely
to be an impediment to cooperation for broader issues such as climate change. This
provides a rationale for what seems to be the prevailing position in policy circles with
respect to global climate treaties.27
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